Laboratory workers, by the nature of their work, face potential health risks. Daily, they are exposed to radioisotopes, chemicals, and infectious agents. In the past 2 decades, laboratorians have developed programs to deal with these risks.
In the early 1980s, chemical hygiene plans were introduced, addressing risks associated with exposure to chemicals and isotopes. Although early investigators documented the risk of acquiring laboratory-associated infections, the push for safety programs addressing these risks escalated with the advent of the acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) in the 1980s, the associated increase in tuberculosis infections, and the recognition of additional bloodborne hepatitis viruses. Today, laboratories are challenged to develop and implement biosafety programs that minimize or avoid exposure to infectious agents. The current trend toward bedside testing and the use of less experienced personnel in the laboratory underscore the need for biosafety plans.
Several governmental agencies provide guidelines for development of a safety plan. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) addresses safety issues related to bloodborne pathogens 1 and tuberculosis 2 ; the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention addresses safety standards for working with infectious agents 3 ; and the Environmental Protection Agency has drafted guidelines for the management of biohazardous wastes. 4 Because these guidelines are general, however, the laboratory director must assimilate this information and develop a safety plan that meets the specific needs of his or her laboratory.
Historical Background
To develop an effective biosafety program, health care workers must understand how they become infected and how they can prevent the spread of infectious agents. Much This is the first in a three-part continuing education series on laboratory safety. On completion of the series, the reader will be able to recognize the causes of exposure to infectious agents in the laboratory and develop a biological safety plan, understand the health risks associated with formaldehyde, and identify breaches of safety in the clinical laboratory.
on the pioneering work of Sulkin and Pike. Their work, along with others, identified infectious hazards in the laboratory and became the foundation for our current approach to the prevention of laboratory-acquired infections. 8 A review of the 1980 to 1991 literature indicated that S typhi, Brucella spp, Chlamydia spp, arboviruses, hantaviruses, and C burnetii were associated with most of the laboratoryacquired infections. 9 Although most clinical laboratories rarely recover these organisms today, they still represent a potential hazard. Today, the greatest concern among laboratory workers is exposure to blood or body fluids containing the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) and the hepatitis viruses.
The risk of becoming infected after exposure varies with the concentration of virus in the fluid and the method of exposure. The risks are approximately 6% to 30% for hepatitis B virus (HBV), 2% to 10% for hepatitis C virus, and 0.4% for HIV. 10 With the advent of biological safety cabinets (BSC) and other safety measures geared toward the prevention of transmission by aerosols, the etiology of laboratory-acquired infections has shifted from the bacteria and rickettsia to viruses acquired through contact with blood and body fluids. Phlebotomists are at greatest risk of exposure to infected blood and body fluids, as are laboratorians who routinely handle these specimens. Culture-amplified microorganisms remain an important potential source of laboratory-associated infections for those working in the microbiology section.
Sources of Exposure to Infectious Agents in the Laboratory
To become infected, the laboratorian must come into contact with an infectious agent. The usual route of infection is exposure to contaminated blood, body fluids, or tissue. Patient cultures, proficiency test samples, stock cultures, and quality control strains also are potential sources of infection for those working in the clinical microbiology laboratory. The most common sources and associated practices that lead to exposure to an infectious agent are listed in Table 1 . Microorganisms can be accidentally ingested by splashes from cultures or specimens, contaminated fingers or objects placed in the mouth, and such prohibited practices as mouth pipetting or consuming food contaminated in the workplace. OSHA addressed these risks by prohibiting all eating, drinking, and the application of cosmetics in the laboratory.
Although intact skin provides an excellent barrier to infectious agents, the laboratorian may be exposed by accidental parenteral inoculation of infectious material (for example, through needlestick, scalpel cuts, or glass cuts) or may be contaminated via normal small cuts and abrasions that provide microbial access to underlying tissue. In 1976, approximately 70% of laboratoryacquired infections resulted from splashes, needlesticks, and cuts from sharp objects. 8 Although current data are not readily available, it appears that these types of accidents occur less frequently today than they did in the past. The reason for this may be the use of personal protective equipment and procedural changes.
Many infections in the microbiology laboratory have been caused by inhalation of infectious droplet nuclei created through procedures that generate aerosols. Improper use of inoculating loops, pipettes, syringes, centrifuges, mixers, and autopsy saws produce aerosols, as do such practices as decanting fluid or opening vessels containing infectious agents.
Prevention of Laboratory-Acquired Infections
For most laboratories, risk of exposure is associated with phlebotomy; handling blood, body fluids, and other clinical specimens; culturing biological safety level-2 (BSL-2) microorganisms; and occasionally culturing BSL-3 agents (eg, M tuberculosis, Brucella spp). After the potential risk associated with each task is determined, the biosafety plan should identify the appropriate level of personal protective equipment (PPE), microbiologic procedures, and the location of work (eg, BSC) necessary to minimize the exposure of the worker. The BSLs range from BSL-1 to BSL-4 ( Table 2) . Each increasing BSL implies increasing risk associated with a potential exposure to that organism and therefore requires more stringent containment practices to prevent potential exposure. Gilchrist, Hindler, and Fleming 11 proposed a model exposure control plan for many laboratory tasks.
Blood collection, specimen handling, and specimen processing pose the greatest risk for the acquisition of bloodborne infections (eg, HIV, hepatitis). Universal precautions presuppose that all blood, body fluids, tissue, and other patient specimens submitted to the laboratory are potentially infectious. These precautions are taken to minimize the risk associated with phlebotomy and the manipulation of these materials. Phlebotomists should wear such PPE as gloves and a laboratory coat when performing venipuncture, and, subsequently, when handling blood. They also should take care not to spill blood during the procedure, and to avoid accidental needlesticks when transferring blood from a syringe to a tube. Needles must never be recapped by hand; if recapping is necessary, a mechanical device or a one-handed technique should be used. Used needles and syringes must be discarded in an approved sharps container. Any outside contamination of the collection tube should be removed with an alcohol pad.
Laboratorians who handle and test primary specimens (eg, centrifugation of blood, serologic tests, direct fluorescent antibody tests), as well as those who plate specimens and subculture blood bottles, should wear gloves, coats or gowns, and face or splatter shields, and should use a sharps container to dispose of needles, blades, and syringes. Gloves are essential because most specimen tubes, containers, and processing equipment are contaminated. In one study, 6% of serum containers were contaminated by HBV and 3% by HIV.
12 Because all gloves may break, hands should be washed after gloves are removed.
Laboratorians should wear such eye and mouth protection as goggles, face and splatter shields, and masks whenever a potential for splatter or splashes exists. They should take these precautions when manipulating primary specimens (eg, uncapping tubes, preparing blood smears, and subculturing blood botdes). Protective clothing that is resistant to liquid should be worn to avoid contamination of skin. Because these items are uncomfortable to wear for long periods, laboratory staff should first try to minimize potential exposure from splashes or spills by changing work routines. For example, they may use racks, plastic tubes, and carts to avoid accidental breakage, and may work behind shields during high-risk procedures. The elimination of needle and syringes, blades, and glassware in the laboratory would gready reduce the risk of laboratory-acquired infections. Needles and syringes produce aerosols, contaminate fingers and surroundings, and, most importantly, may cause accidental inoculation of the user. The laboratorian can reduce these risks by using needle-locking syringes, wearing gloves, working in a BSC, refraining from recapping needles, and using conveniently placed sharps containers. 10 Each laboratory must implement a plan to handle the occasional accidental spill of infectious material. The plan depends on the microorganism involved, the type and quantity of material, and whether an aerosol was produced. See "Supplemental Readings" following this article for guidelines and protocols on handling accidents involving infectious material.
Waste management and disposal plans vary with state and local requirements and regulations. In general, infectious materials must be separated from other wastes and placed in leakproof red bags or bags with the universal biohazard symbol. Sharps must be placed in leakproof, punctureresistant containers. All infectious material must be incinerated or disinfected before disposal.
Developing a Biological Safety Plan
The infectious agent that can be transmitted by a variety of routes and that produces infection at a low-infectious dose poses the greatest risk to laboratory workers. To reduce risk, the microorganism should be contained through physical factors 6 7 6 LABORATORY MEDICINE VOLUME 27. NUMBER 10 OCTOBER 1996
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(eg, BSC, safety centrifuge cups), microbiological practices (eg, PPE, limit exposure to sharps), and administrative controls (eg, biological signs, procedures, education). The laboratory therefore can develop an exposure control plan by assessing the potential occupational risk associated with each routine task in the clinical laboratory. Because nearly all tasks are associated with some potential risk, each step associated with the task must be identified and assessed. Then appropriate safety measures can be implemented to minimize this risk. Although the potential risk cannot be eliminated, it can be minimized.
Risk is assessed by considering the pathogenicity, transmission routes, and viability of the infectious microorganism; the infectious material handled (eg, clinical specimens or amplified cultures); the microbiologic procedures used (eg, pipetting, centrifugation); and, most importantly, the experience of the laboratorian. In general, risk assessment should focus more on the appropriate safety practices for handling such infectious material as blood, body fluids, and cultures rather than on a specific infectious agent. Also, the exposure control plan should be tailored to meet the specific needs of the individual laboratory. A laboratory does not need a BSL-3 containment room, for example, if BSL-3 organisms are rarely cultured. The laboratory can use BSL-3 practices, however, (eg, techniques to prevent accidental breakage of tubes, use of BSC for these cultures) in a BSL-2 facility."
A biosafety plan should stratify the potential risk associated with a task based on the BSL of the microorganism as defined by the CDC guidelines (see Table 2 ). 3 The assignment of a microorganism to a particular BSL is based on the pathogenicity of the agent; the associated morbidity and mortality; the epidemic potential; the infectious dose; the mode of transmission; the animals, including humans, that can harbor the organism or can be infected; and the viability of the agent in the laboratory environment.
In general, increasing risk of infection following exposure is associated with agents that can be transmitted by a number of routes and are infectious at low doses (Table 3) . BSL-1 safety practices are recommended for teaching activities with microorganisms, such as Bacillus spp, that are not usually associated with human infections, while BSL-4 practices are required for highly infectious agents, such as the Ebola virus, that are not generally handled in routine clinical laboratories. Most routine clinical laboratories use BSL-2 practices unless their workload includes large numbers of specimens for mycology and mycobacteriology. In that case, they would use BSL-3 practices, including a containment facility with negative-pressure airflow, double doors, and air exhaust to the outside.
After assessing the risk associated with each task performed in the laboratory, the facility director implements a biosafety plan. Microbiologic practices may be changed to reduce the potential for generation of aerosols or splashes; appropriate safety equipment (eg, PPE, BSCs, safety centrifuge cups) must be provided; engineering and facility design should be changed to provide negative ventilation with respect to outside corridors, if necessary; and a comprehensive safety program is established. This program consists of written procedures; mandatory training of employees in the occupational risks associated with laboratory tasks and techniques used to reduce risk; and an employee health plan that provides vaccinations, identifies preemployment exposure to infectious agents and highly susceptible employees (eg, those who are immunocompromised, pregnant), and maintains exposure and treatment records of employees.
Conclusion
Biosafety programs protect laboratory workers at risk from exposure to bloodborne viruses and culture-amplified bacteria by providing information on the route of transmission of infectious agencts in the laboratory environment and safety practices that are designed to contain the microorganisms or to interrupt transmission to the worker. Potential sources of infectious agents include all patient specimens as well as cultures, proficiency test samples, and quality control strains. Microorganisms are acquired by ingestion, accidental inoculation, spills or splashes on skin and mucous membranes, and inhalation of infectious aerosols. Transmission of infectious agents is prevented by using PPE (eg, gloves, face shields, laboratory coats), working with highly infectious agents in BSCs, and elimination of hazardous procedures in the laboratory (eg, recapping needles). Although the biosafety program can provide the tools to minimize laboratory-acquired For more information circle no. 004 on card infections, the individual worker must assume the responsibility for always adhering to the safety guidelines.®
